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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This matter is before this Court under Rule 3, Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure,
pursuant to a notice of appeal filed by the appellants in the Third District Court on
February 8, 2000. This appeal stemsfromthe final order and judgment of the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment and granting
appellee's motion for summary judgment. (Record 93-97).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
In addition to issue number 1 presented by appellants, whether the Utah PIP
statutes Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306, et. seq., mandate payment of household services
and lost income benefits to a decedent's estate, appellee presents as an additional issue
on appeal whether the appellants' claim that the insurance contract is ambiguous, in order
to extend the scope of coverage, was properly presented to the trial court thereby
allowing consideration by this Court.
STANDARD OF APPELLANT REVIEW FOR ISSUE NOT RAISED
IN THE TRIAL COURT
In order for a substantive issue to be preserved for appeal, it must have been raised
before the trial court. West One Bank Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882, Note 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This Court's standard requires more than a mere mention of such
an issue in the pleadings and requires a party to present evidence of ambiguity to the trial
court in order to develop a record sufficient to present an appeal. See: Hart v. Salt Lake

2

County Com % 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). Appellants' brief is devoid of any
citation to the record or pleadings showing this issue was presented to the court below.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY REFERENCES
This appeal is based on the no-fault, personal injury protection benefits found in
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-306, et seq. Set forth below are the pertinent statutory
provisions, pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(b) Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure. Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-306, provides:
Personal injury protection.
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons
described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations,
exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1)(1994), provides:
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits
include:
(a)

The reasonable value of all expenses for
necessary medical, surgical...not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person;

(b)(i) The lesser of $250.00 per week or 85%
of any loss of gross income and loss of
earning capacity per person from
inability to work, for a maximum of 52
consecutive weeks after the loss, except
that this benefit need not be paid for the
first three days of disability,...
(ii)

A special damage allowance not
exceeding $20.00 per day for a
3

maximum of 365 days, for services
actually rendered or expenses reasonably
incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have
performed for his household...
(c)

Funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed $1,500
person; and

(d)

Compensation on account of death of a person, payable to
his heirs, in the total of $3,000.

Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-308(1990), states:
Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury
protection coverage:
(1)

the named insured, when injured in an accident
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the
accident occurs in this state, the United States, its
territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the
injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under
the policy;

(2)

persons related to the insured by blood, marriage,
adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the
insured's household, including those who usually
make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances
described in Section (1), except where the person is
injured as a result of the use or operation of his own
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and

(3)

any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an
automobile accident occurring while the person
occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with
the express or implied consent of the named insured or
4

while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident
occurring in Utah involving the described motor
vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from a suit for declaratory judgment filed by appellee, Regal
Insurance Company, against the appellants. Appellants' son was a passenger in a vehicle
owned and operated by an acquaintance, Jason L. Allen. Mr. Allen lost control of his
vehicle on November 7, 1998 and the vehicle rolled and killed Jesse Bott instantly.
Appellee, under its policy of insurance issued to Mr. Allen and his vehicle, paid over to
the appellants $1,500.00 for the funeral/burial benefits and $3,000 representing the death
benefit. It subsequently paid to the appellants $25,000 representing the bodily injury
liability limits available under the policy.
Appellants sought additional personal injury protection benefits as a result of
Jesse Bott's death, comprising $20.00 per day for 365 days, representing the special
damages allowance for household services, and $250.00 per week for 52 weeks,
representing loss of income benefits. Appellee then filed the declaratory judgment action
and upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied the appellants'
claims and granted appellee's motion that the appellants were not entitled to these
additional benefits and entered judgment accordingly.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts are gleaned from the record and the addendum to this brief.
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1.

Appellee's policy of insurance at issue here was issued to Jason Allen and

covered the vehicle he was driving on November 7, 1998. (Record 56-58).
2.

Jesse Bott was a passenger in that vehicle. (Id.)

3.

Jesse Bott was unmarried at the time and resided with his parents, the

appellants. (Id.)
4.

The Allen vehicle was involved in a one-car rollover and Jesse Bott died

instantly from the injuries he received in that accident. (Id. 56-58).
5.

Appellee paid to appellants on December 4,1998, $1,500.00 representing

the funeral/burial benefits and on December 7, 1998, $3,000, representing the death
benefits under the policy, and subsequently on February 8,1999, $25,000, representing
the bodily injury limits. (Id, 56-58).
6.

Appellants also demanded lost household services of $20.00 per day for

365 days and $250.00 per week for 52 weeks for loss of income. (Record 33-38).
7.

Appellee initiated the declaratory judgment action on August 5,1999,

which included a copy of the policy in question. (Record 1-26).
8.

The policy provided personal injury protection coverage on pages 4-7

(Record 8-11) of the policy, to wit:
1.

PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE

We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on
behalf of each eligible injured person for:
A.

medical expenses,
6

9.

H.

work loss,

I.

funeral expenses, and

J.

survivor loss.

Under the definitions contained within that section, the policy defined

certain critical terms:
A.

Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death resulting therefrom;

B.

Eligible injured person means:
(1) the named insured or any
relative who sustains bodily
injury caused by an accident
involving the use of any motor
vehicle;
(2) any other person who
sustains bodily injury caused by
an accident while:
(a) occupying the insured motor
vehicle with the consent of the
insured, or
(b) a pedestrian if the accident
occurs in Utah and involves the
use of the insured motor vehicle.

M.

Work loss means:
1

loss of income and loss of earning
capacity by the eligible injured person
during his lifetime, from inability to
work during a period commencing three
days after the date of the loss of gross
7

income and loss of earning capacity and
continuing for a maximum of 52
consecutive weeks thereafter, provided
that if such eligible injured person's
inability to work shall so continue for in
excess of a total of two consecutive
weeks after the date of the loss of gross
income and loss of earning capacity, this
three day elimination period shall not be
applicable; and
2

10.

an allowance for services actually
rendered or expenses reasonably
incurred that, but for the bodily injury,
the eligible injured person would have
performed during his lifetime for his
household, commencing three days after
the date of the bodily injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365
consecutive days thereafter; provided
that if such eligible injured person's
inability to perform such services shall
continue for in excess of two
consecutive weeks after the date of the
bodily injury, this three day elimination
period shall not be applicable.

The appellants are acting individually and for the estate of Jesse

Bott, pursuant to the Order of January 4, 2000. (Record 88-89).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The no-fault act is designed to provide a non-judicial method of temporary
compensation for individuals disabled in an automobile accident. In the case of a
resulting death, the legislature provided a funeral/burial benefit of $1,500 and a death
benefit of $3,000 payable to the heirs. Death and disability are not synonymous and a no8

fault claimant who dies instantly in an automobile accident does not empower his heirs or
estate to collect the disability benefits of lost income and lost household services.
Extending such coverage violates the intent of the act in providing temporary
compensation to injured individuals during their period of recuperation.
The legislature understood the difference between "disability" and "death," when
it enacted the no-fault legislation and intentionally omitted "estates," in total, and "heirs,"
except for the death benefit, as recipients entitled to no-fault benefits. Lost household
services and lost income are reserved to those surviving and recuperating from injuries
sustained in an automobile accident.
The policy language in question provides no broader coverage and the appellants
never raised the issue of the policy's ambiguity in the court below. Therefore, they have
waived any claim to bring that issue before this court on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MANDATORY COVERAGE DOES NOT EQUAL MANDATORY PAYMENT;
AND, THE NO-FAULT ACT MUST BE CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND ITS ENACTMENT.

This Court has examined claims for personal injury protection benefits before and
it did not do so in isolation of the legislature's intent in enacting the no-fault act. In
Versluis v. Guaranty Nat Co., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992), the plaintiff was involved in
an automobile accident and sought disability benefits for work loss compensation, even
9

though she demonstrated no work history. This Court examined the legislative history
behind the no-fault statutes, stating:
When construing a statute, we must give effect to legislative
intent, West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah
1982). To that end, we presume that the Legislature used
each term advisedly, and we give effect to each term
according to this ordinary and accepted meaning. Id. For
assistance in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language,
we look to the background and general purpose of the statute.
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958, 959
(Utah 1977).
The No-fault Automobile Insurance Act was enacted "[t]o
effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out of
automobile accidents." Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-2 (1974).
PIP benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation
for out-of-pocket expenses and actual * loss of earnings
occurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a
lawsuit. See Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959. Unlike an award of
damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are paid
monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living
expenses. Utah CodeAnn.§ 31A-22-309(5). PIP benefits
were not intended "to provide an automatic reward or a
'windfall,' for being involved in an accident by requiring
payment when there was no loss actually suffered..."
Jamison, 559 P.2d at 960. Although Jamison dealt with PIP
benefits for loss of household services, the basic policy
referred to there applies equally to disability benefits.
Id. at 867. (Emphasis added).
This Court then rejected the plaintiffs contention that she was entitled to the nofault benefits "merely by showing a loss of earning capacity and nothing more (as) not
consistent with either the statutory language or the policy of the act." Id.
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Similarly, appellants' claims here must be analyzed under the light cast by the nofault statutes. Respondent concedes that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306 (1986), requires
automobile insurance policies to make available personal injury protection coverages to
those persons described in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1990). However, the fact that
a policy provides those coverages does not mean automatic payment as the appellants
seek here. In fact, the appellants do not even fall within the class of persons covered by
personal injury protection. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1990), defines those classes
of persons to whom personal injury protection benefits must be extended, to wit:
Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury
protection coverage:
(1)

the named insured, when injured in an accident
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the
accident occurs in this state, the United States, its
territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the
injury is the result of the use or operation of the named
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under
the policy;

(2)

persons related to the insured by blood, marriage,
adoption, or guardianship who are residents of the
insured's household, including those who usually
make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances
described in Section (1), except where the person is
injured as a result of the use or operation of his own
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and

(3)

any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an
automobile accident occurring while the person
11

occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with
the express or implied consent of the named insured or
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident
occurring in Utah involving the described motor
vehicle.
(Emphasis supplied).
Keeping in mind that Jesse Bott was a passenger in the Allen vehicle for which
this policy was issued, Jesse Bott was only entitled to coverage under subsection (3) as a
person occupying a motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured. His estate
and parents are not "persons covered by personal injury protection" under the statute.
This approach is not novel. In Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 582 (Ky.
App. 1981), the Kentucky court wrestled with the same issues as brought to this court. In
that case, the estate of the decedent who was killed instantly in an automobile accident
sought "work loss" benefits. The Kentucky court, after examining its state's personal
injury protection statutes, held that the estate of the decedent was not a "person" entitled
to those benefits and that those benefits were reserved to living human beings while
absent from work. Id. at 588-89. See also: Flannigan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Mass.
195, 417 N.E.2d 1216 (1981), wherein the Massachusetts court rejected a suit by the
heirs for the lost wages of the decedent, holding that the personal injury protection
statutes provided reimbursement for lost wages to living individuals, not to heirs or
estates.
Examining Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1994), provides further evidence of the

12

legislature's intent. That statute provides:
(1)

Personal injury protection coveiages and benefits
include:
(a)

the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical,
surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic
devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person;

(b) (i)

the lesser of $250 per week of 85% of any loss of
gross income and maximum of 52 consecutive weeks
after the loss, except that this benefit need not be paid
for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive
weeks after the date of injury; and

(ii)

a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day
for a maximum of 365 days, for services actually
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services
that, but for the injury, the injured person would
have performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after
the date of injury unless the person's inability to
perform these services continues for more than two
consecutive weeks;

(c)

funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of
$1,500 per person; and

(d)

compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his
heirs, in the total of $3,000.

(Emphasis added). The legislature never used the term "estate" as a beneficiary entitled
to any benefits at all. It extended benefits to the person in subsections (a), (b), (c) and to
the heirs only under (d). The legislature never extended to heirs or estates work loss or
special damage benefits.
13

This conclusion is further buttressed by the legislature's scheme relating to the
payment of benefits. In the case of a death, the funeral benefit and death benefit are
immediately payable in lump sums. In the case of an injured PIP recipient, the benefits
for lost household services and lost income are payable monthly, "as expenses are
incurred;' Utah Code Ann, § 31 A-22-309(5)(a)(1994). It makes no sense to provide
monthly payments for lost household services and lost income in the case of death.
In the instant case, the death of Jesse Bott provided his heirs exactly one benefit,
as found under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(d), "compensation on account of death
of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000." Additionally, Jesse Bott under
subsection (c) was entitled to funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total
of $1,500 per person. Both of these benefits have been paid under this policy, and the
appellants are entitled to no more.
POINT II
DEATH AND DISABILITY ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS AND THE NO-FAULT ACT
DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR LOST HOUSEHOLD SERVICES AND WORK LOSS
FROM AN INSTANTANEOUS DEATH IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT.
As this court recognized in Versluis, supra at 867, PIP benefits are intended to
provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings
without a lawsuit. Moreover, this court recognized that PIP disability benefits "are paid
monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses." This court also
presumes that the legislature used each term in a statute advisedly and "gives effect to

14

each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id., quoting West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
In describing the class of PIP benefits that the legislature mandated that
automobile insurance policies cover under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1994), the
legislature used very specific language. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l) subsection (b)
(i)-loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity-extends compensation only to
persons suffering a "disability" from "inability to work" forfifty-twoconsecutive weeks.
When the legislature requires that household services be paid, it defined those services as
ones the "injured person would have performed for the household." The legislature
steered away from including in these two categories "death" and it did so in the face of
judicial holdings by this court distinguishing "disability" from "death."
In Jones v. Trans America Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), the claimant
sought lost wages and lost household services, as the appellants seek here. This Court
refused to extend those benefits in Jones, holding that:
The benefits contemplated by the Act are phrased in terms of
"disability" not in terms of "physical impairment." The
former is generally understood to mean the inability to work,
whereas the latter refers to the loss of bodily
function...Likewise, if not disabled for purposes of loss of
earnings benefits, neither is he disabled for purposes of
household services benefits. Indeed, the act was never
intended to give an injured plaintiff a windfall or extra
income as a benefit of having had an accident.
(Id at 61 l-12)(Citations omitted).
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Further, this Court in Marriott v. Pacific Nat. Assur. Co., 24 Ut.2d 182,467 P.2d
981 (1970), examined a claim by the administrator of an estate seeking to recover
benefits under a group insurance program. The decedent was killed on the job and the
insurance company denied benefits because the death occurred before the eligibility date
had been reached. The policy contained a provision that an employee who had become
"disabled" while on the job, could continue to accrue time towards the eligibility date
even though that employee could not work or pay for any of the insurance benefits. The
administrator of the estate argued that the fact that the decedent was killed in the accident
before the eligibility date meant that the decedent was "disabled" and, therefore, his
estate was entitled to coverage upon the eligibility date being reached had he survived.
Id. at 982. This Court rejected this approach as being a hyper-technical extension of the
plain language of the contract. Id. at 983. This Court held that the term "disabled" is quite
different from death and that no coverage was available to the estate. Id.
Appellants' approach here has already been rejected by other courts. In Hamrich
v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 270 So. C. 176, 241 S.E.2d 548 (1978), the
administrator of the estate tried the same approach under a similar statutory scheme. In
that case, the administrator of the decedent's estate sought the lost income PIP benefits
when her husband was killed in an automobile/pedestrian accident. Her approach was
that death was the ultimate disability. The South Carolina court rejected her approach
when examining its no-fault statutes and determined that no-fault benefits were to assist
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injured persons while recuperating because those statute used the term "disability"
regarding lost income benefits. The court went on to hold that disability meant the
inability of a living person to work. Id. at 550. The disability terminated at recovery from
the injury or death. Id. at 550.
Therefore, in the face of legislative history and judicial precedent, the no-fault
statutes clearly distinguish benefits which are extended to insureds who suffer
"disability" versus those who suffer "death." A person falling within the no-fault
coverages provided does not obtain both disability and death benefits, as argued by the
appellants here. Jesse Bott died instantly in the automobile accident and was entitled to
funeral benefits and his "heirs" were entitled to the death benefit. Those benefits have
been paid and work loss benefits and household services benefits are not available under
the facts of this case. In fact, to extend work loss benefits and household services in the
face of an instantaneous death, would violate the very purpose of the act. As this Court
has recognized, the purpose of the no-fault act is to assist those persons who are disabled
as a result of an automobile accident to recoup out-of-pocket expenses and receive
income during the period of their disability to meet basic living expenses until the person
returns to work. Those benefits are paid on a monthly basis. It makes no sense to pay
those benefits on a monthly basis for a death. To accept the appellant's position here,
would nullify the plain language of the statute and emasculate its purpose in being
enacted in its present form.
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POINT III
APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THE POLICY IS AMBIGUOUS, HAVING BEEN
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, IS NOT PRESERVED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT AND THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO
ADDRESS IT.
The claim of ambiguity is raised for the first time in appellants' brief, precluding
this court from considering that issue. This is not novel law. In Hart v. Salt Lake County
Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997), the county appealed an adverse jury verdict in
an automobile accident case, claiming it owed no duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
challenged the county's appeal of that issue, arguing that the county had failed to
preserve the issue for appeal since it had not raised that issue before the trial court. Our
court of appeals agreed and declined to address that issue, holding:
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first
raise the issue before the trial court. See West One Bank,
Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). '"A matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the
trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on
the issue." State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (citations omitted). For a court to be "afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue," several requirements must
be met. First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion.
This court has explained:
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a
party must timely bring the issue to the attention
of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 'Issues
not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are
deemed waived, precluding [the appellate
court] from considering their merits on
appeal.9"
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Online Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 n. 1 (Utah
Ct. Axo. 1993) (citations omitted). Second, the issue must be
specifically raised, see State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21
(Utah 1989), such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a
"level of consciousness" before the trial court, James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Third, the
party must introduce to the trial court "supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority" to support its argument. Tolman v.
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (citations omitted); see also West One Bank, 887
P.2d at 882 n. 1 (" The mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings...is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.'" (quoting
LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters. Inc., 823 P.2d 479,
482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991))).
(Id) at 129-30.
In the case at bar, the pleadings are devoid of any mention or claim by the
appellants that the policy provisions in question are ambiguous. In fact, under paragraph
2 of their answer and counter claim, they state: "that the contract speaks for itself."
(Record 33). A review of appellants' motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum (Record 59-69) demonstrates that the terms "ambiguous" or "ambiguity"
or their derivatives were not used, let alone presented as a basis of argument. The
transcript of oral argument (Record R 98; full text attached as addendum) demonstrates
again that these terms were never mentioned, nor was the issue of ambiguity focused
upon for consideration by the trial court.
The appellants have not preserved this issue for consideration by this court. It was
not timely raised nor specifically raised in the court below. Further, appellants presented
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no evidence of ambiguity or relevant legal authority in support of their argument.
Additio

a

hint that ambiguity is an issue to be decided in this case. Therefore, this court should
decline to address the issue of ambiguity. Hart, supra at 131
POIN
ASSUMING APPELLANTS HAVE PRESERVED AMBIGuil Y ut THE
INSURANCE CONTRACT ON APPEAL, REGAL'S POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOI IS
IT IS NOT BROADER THAN THE STATUTES, THE APPELLANTS DO NOT
QUALIFY AS AN "ELIGIBLE INJURED PERSON," AND WORK LOSS AND
HOUSEHOLD SERVICES ARE RESTRICTED TO LIVING INDIVIDUALS.
A.
APPELLAh r
AMBIGUOUS

— NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE POLIC

In Nielsen v. O 'Reilfy, 848 P.2d 664, 665-66 (Utah 1Q9?
long- standing law regarding the interpretation of insurance contracts:
,, Generally, the interpretation of insurance policy language
presents a question of law to be decided by the trial judge
using accepted methods of construction. Specifically, the
terms of insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are t be
interpreted in accordance with their usually accepted
meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract
provisions...Policy language is ambiguous if it is not "plain to
a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual
and natural meaning of the words, and in the light of existing
circumstances, including the purpose of the policy.
(Citations omitted).
This court has not deviated from its earlier pronouncements that:
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When a question arises regarding a written document, the
first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered
in its entirety.
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).
The rules of these cases mandate against the appellants' construction of the policy
in this case. This Court does not recognize strained or hyper-technical extensions of
policy language in order to derive some sort of ambiguity, as urged by appellants in their
brief. Turning to the policy language, and looking at the entire policy, the definitions in
ordinary and plain terms, describe these persons entitled coverage.
The personal injury protection coverages are set forth within the policy under
PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, found at pages 4
through 7 (R 8-11) of the policy attached to the complaint onfile.Persons entitled to PIP
coverages are defined as "eligible injured persons." The policy provides the definition of
that term at (R 9) as follows:
B.

"Eligible injured person" means:

(1)

the named insured or any relative who sustains
bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use
of any motor vehicle;

(2)

any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident
while:
(a)

occupying the insured motor
vehicle with the consent of the
insured, or

(b)

a pedestrian if the accident
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occurs in Utah and involves the
use of the insured motor vehicle.
Under this definition, the appellants are not eligible injured persons and they are
not entitled to PIP benefits, other than those set forth under section 5(d) (p. 6 of the
policy, 1. Il 111 which provides a maximum amount payable for survivor loss of $3,001).00
B.
WORK LOSS AND HOUSEHOLD SERVICES ARE PAYABLE ONLY
FOR THE TIME DURING WHICH THE INJURED PERSON LIVES; THEY DO NOT
SURVIVE THE DEATH OF THE INJURED PERSON.
The policy defines the term "work loss" at pages 5-6 (R 9-10), as follows:
loss of income and loss of earning capacity by
the eligible injured person during his lifetime,
from inability to work during a period
commencing three days after the date of the loss
of gross income and loss of earning capacity
and continuing for a maximum of 52
consecutive weeks thereafter, provided that if
such eligible injured person's inability to
work shall so continue for in excess of a total of
two consecutive weeks after the date of the loss
of gross income and loss of earning capacity,
this three day elimination period shall not be
applicable; and
(2)

an allowance for services actually rendered or
expenses reasonably incurred that, but for the bodily
injury, the eligible injured person would have
performed during his lifetime for his household,
commencing three days after the date of the bodily
injury and continuing for a maximum of 365
consecutive days thereafter; provided that if such
eligible injured person's inability to perform such
services shall continue for an excess of two
consecutive weeks after the date of the bodily injury,
this three day elimination period shall not be
22

applicable.
(Emphasis added).
Under these definitions, the benefits are provided while the injured person~not a
decedent-is disabled as a result of the accident.
It is axiomatic that language in an insurance policy is given its plain and ordinary
meaning. The term "lifetime" is not equivalent to "life span". Taking the simplest
approach and simply going to the dictionaries, such as Houghton, Mifflin, New College
Edition The American Heritage Dictionary the English Language (American Heritage
Pub. Co., Inc. and Houghton, Mifflin Company 1975), at page 755, the definition of the
term "lifetime" is given as follows:
n. 1 The period of time during which an individual is alive. 2
The interval or amount of time during which an object,
property, process or phenomenon exists or functions, -adj
continuing or lasting for such a period of time: A lifetime
guarantee.
This is a different concept from "life span"--defined as:
The period of time during which an organism remains alive
under normal or optimum conditions.

(14).
In Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1983), at
page 690, the following definition of the term "lifetime" is given:
H.(1 3c) 1: The duration of the existence of a living being or a
thing 2: The duration of the existence of an ion or subatomic
particle 3: An amount accumulated or experienced in a
lifetime...
23

Black \ I iiw I UctioNun I West I'nli " n |w% I ill i (Inn mil pi i ink ,i ili'linifiun
of lifeti1

•

• ) M it iloes LMVC .I legal definition of the te oil "life " as

follows:
That state of animals, humans, and plants or of an organized
being, in which its natural functions and motions are
performed, or in which its organs are capable of performing
their functions. The interval between birth and death. The
sum of the forces by which death is resisted...
Therefore, under the ordinary usage of the term lifetime, it is clear that work loss
is available only while the insured is unable to perform work and is living.
Appellants claim that because the policy defines "bodily injury" to mean "bodily
injury, sickness. or disease, including death resulting therefrom" (policy page 5, R at 9),
that broader coverage is afforded. Their position has been considered by other courts and
has been rejected. In Perez v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 32 (Ore. 1980),
the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a policy which provided work-loss benefits in the
contr-

automobile/pedestrian fatality. Neither flu pohn inm Hm
t ,ill,!ink1 driinnl flu

terms "injured person" or "disability." The court recognized that the word "disability"
ordinarily did not describe death, although death "is undeniably the ultimate disability."
(id. i

held that the term involves the inability of a person to perform

activities due to physical incapacity or weakness,, but in I <lr;ilh 1 lie re ill! I I ml>, lllii.il
approach in reviewing the statutory no-fault language that the work-loss benefits had not
been intended by the legislature to be extended in cases of death.
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In the case of Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 613 P.2d 36 (Ore. 1980), the court
held that the term "disability" found within the statute meant the inability, while living, to
perform one's usual activities. The court held that death was not disability and there
could be no loss of income benefits due under the policy, even though the policy
included the term death within its definition of "bodily injury." In that case, the Oregon
Supreme Court found that even though the policy included death within its definition of
"bodily injury," as the Regal policy does here, it did not create an ambiguity. Rather, it
clarified the provision that the company would pay funeral expenses "incurred with
respect to bodily injury." (Id. at 38). The court looked to several other jurisdictions which
had reached the same conclusion, in issuing its holding.
In the case at bar, it is the appellants' position that strains the ordinary language of
the insurance contract in an attempt to create an ambiguity to escape the terms of the
policy and the legislature's intent. This court should reject this strained approach and
affirm the trial court and hold that the policy does not create any ambiguities.
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF
Appellants are entitled to no further benefits under the statutory provisions or the
policy language in question, since they have been fully compensated. Appellants are not
"persons" under either the policy or the statutes who are entitled to personal injury
protection benefits beyond the funeral/burial benefits and death benefits that they have
already received from appellee. In the case of almost instantaneous death, as has occurred
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here the heirs and/or estate of the deceased occupant of a motor vehicle are not entitled
to reien r linniisdiiiild * n\ IN i iiml 11 »( iiin inin* hniciils I hnsi Iknefih lire res* n nl In
injured persons "disabled" by an automobile accident in order to assist them during the
recuperation period, and which benefits are paid monthly during the disability period.
Once the disability ends and they return to work, whether it is several weeks or several
months llii" benefits termina
extended to living persons. To extend these benefits to decedents violates the statutory
purposes behind the no-fault act. Additionally, appellants cannot claim that the policy is
ambiguous since they did not preserve that issue in the court below by raising it in either
HI I .muni)1 lh.il llns i nurt

their pleadr

wishes to reach that issue, the policy language is not ambiguous. Therefore, this court
should affirm the order and judgment of the trial court.
ADDENDUM
A

„

as Exhibit "A"; the full text of the trial court's order regarding the

—

-n

motions

summary judgment as Exhibit "B"; the judgement entered by the trial court as Exhibit
a full copy of the transcript of oral argument as Exhibit "D"; a fully copy of page
7SS nl Ihiu^ii/iii ill'ii'i'i in

,Y
' II

iir i 'i »//<•#(' IUIUKMI iln imencan Heritage Dictionary the

English Language (American Heritage Pub. Co., Inc. and Houghton, Mif"
1975) as Exhibit "E"; a fully copy of page 690, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate

26

Dictionary (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1983) as Exhibit "F"; and a fully copy of page 923,
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub. Co. 1996 Ed.) as Exhibit "G".
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _X7_ day of September,/000

sakalos
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the c^M day of September, 2000, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were deposited in the U.S. Mail, firstclass postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Steven B. Smith
Darwin H. Bingham
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
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(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor \«-hic!</
nsurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under t h
lection.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted
L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1.

5y

31A-22-306, Personal injury protection,
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the
coverages and benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions,
and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by
L, 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158.
-iJ.ATER.AI , KK:VKKNVKS
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no
fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) cover-

ages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29
A.L.R.4th 12.

31A-22-307. Personal inji
benefits.

coverages a n d

(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical,
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance,
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the
date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured
person would have performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury
unless the person's inability to perform these services continues for
more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to ex.c< - •
:,; ->f $1,500
per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable :.
JIII \
in the total of $3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value study of services and accommodations
for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in
the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine
the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation.
The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study, the
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INSURANCE CODE

department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private
medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs and
expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the
relative value study shall be funded by the tax created under Section
59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation.
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined
by applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the
service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or
accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge
under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation
shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of
such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of
healing.
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's
spouse only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the
insured states in writing that:
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the
insured's spouse received any earned income from regular employment;
and
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the
period of insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will
receive earned income from regular employment.
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from
other coverages in the same policy.
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages
required under this section.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159;

1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991,
ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

wable benefits.
[ousehold services.
,oss of earnings.
itration panel.
missal of claim.
le computation.
t claims.
Availability of insurance benefits.
Motorist's liability.
owable benefits.
Household s e r v i c e s .
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of
sse expenses are actually incurred" in former
rsion of this section was included to elimite the necessity of proving such expenses and
prevent the insurer from claiming the benefit
services rendered gratuitously by friends or
latives which otherwise would have to be
ud for; it did not require t h a t reimbursement
? made any time a family lost the services of
le of its members regardless of the character
* those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire
is. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
Former provisions did not require insurer to
ay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured
I an automobile accident $12 per day during
he period of the boy's disablement as reimbursement for the value of lost services, which
i*ould have consisted of doing dishes, carrying
>ut the garbage, washing the family car, and
>ther similar chores because it was not reasonible to assume that the family would in fact
lave incurred expenses to perform the boy's
:hores, and so they were not entitled to reimoursement. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977).
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of
loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "disabled" for purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d
609 (Utah 1979).
The legislature intended to establish the
mandatory household services benefit as an
aggregate maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability,
and not as an individual maximum of $20 on
each day services are actually rendered. Tanner
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
—Loss of e a r n i n g s .
"Disability" refers to the inability to work;
injured party who was able to work during the
period for which disability benefits were sought
and who earned more t h a n $150 per week
during the entire time for which benefits were
sought was not entitled to disability benefits for
loss of earnings. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,

592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
A claimant who was unemployed at the time
of his or her accident can collect disability
benefits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a
job was available for which the claimant was
qualified and that the claimant would have
taken that job. The legislature did not intend to
provide compensation for "loss of earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct
and specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992).
Arbitration panel.
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel
was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Dismissal of claim.
This statute provides no basis on which to
dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct, App
1993).
Time c o m p u t a t i o n .
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection
(l)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and
loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until
six months after an accident and continued to
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly
denied coverage when the trial court only provided for coverage for 52 weeks following the
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
857 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Tort claims.
—Availability of i n s u r a n c e benefits.
No-fault benefits are available to those who
sustain serious injury even though they remain
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the
injured person is not entitled to a double recovery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979).
Where insured brought action against his
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault
benefits after receiving benefits from the nofault insurer and obtaining a judgment against
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional nofault benefits in the form of lost wages but was
not collaterally estopped from recovering for
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins.
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
—Motorist's liability.
A party having the security required under

31A-22-308
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this section is granted partial tort immunity
and is not personally liable for the benefits
provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary tort claims, such as general damages

and economic losses not compensated by the
benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of "nofault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
229.
Validity of state statute prohibiting health

providers from the practice of waiving patients'
obligation to pay health insurance deductibles
or copayments, or advertising such practice 8
A.L.R.5th 855.

31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection.
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage:
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle
not actually insured under the policy;
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1),
except where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his
own motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah
involving the described motor vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Limitation of policy covering driver.
Motorcycle driven by insured.
Out-of-state incidents.
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Passenger in an automobile driven by inured's son but owned by another person was
ot entitled to personal injury protection (PIP)
overage under a policy covering the driver.
McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Motorcycle driven by insured.
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was
applicable to an insured killed while riding a

motorcycle involved in an accident in this state
with a motor vehicle; there is no requirement
that the insured must be operating or occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage,
but only that he be in an accident involving a
motor vehicle. Coates v. American Economy
Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981).
Out-of-state incidents.
In light of language limiting application of
former provisions to accidents in this state,
insurance commissioner's regulation making
no-fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents occurring outside the state was in error.
IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 R2d 296
(Utah 1975), overruled on other grounds, Neel
v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah 1995).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
^X.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
ighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-

surance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.

1A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions lo
personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
Dlicy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
:tion for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been
aused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one
r more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objec
tive findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) An}T insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage uruir' this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the
policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition
incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation
or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on
active duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
;.MY
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(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof
is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;

1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74,
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
able and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or economic evil; further, it
does not violate the uniform operation of laws
provision of Const., Art. I, § 24, because it
makes a reasonable classification between serious and less serious injuries. Warren v.
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
Accrual of cause of action.
Attorney's fees.
—Appeal.
Claims against federal government.
Household exclusion clause.
Personal injury protection requirements.
Pleadings.
Reimbursement.
—Recovery from insured and his insurer.
Release given by injured party to tort-feasor.
Tort claims.
—Liability of insured.
—Pleading and instructions.
Workers' compensation.

Acceptance of monthly payment.
—Effect on insurer's obligation.
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an
insured from a no-fault insurer does not terminate the contractual obligation of the insurer to
make additional payments for subsequently
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).

Constitutionality.
The no-fault statute satisfies the open courts
provision of Utah Const., Art. I, § 11, because it
not only provides a tort victim with a reason-

Accrual of cause of action.
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold requirements under this section. Jepson v. State,
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
Attorney's fees.
—Appeal.
Plaintiff was not required to file a crossappeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins.
Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981).
Claims against federal g o v e r n m e n t .
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided
financial security for its employees in regard to
vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory arbitration under Subsection (6), since this would conflict with the
administrative arrangement established in the
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D.
Utah 1989).
Household e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e .
A household or family exclusion clause in an
automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy and to the statutory requirements
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the
purchaser is not informed of them in writing,
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails to
honor the reasonable expectations of the purchaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
Household or family exclusions are valid in
this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1987).
Personal injury p r o t e c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s .
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsection (6), the individual wTho initially pays the
amounts for which personal injury protection
benefits are also available must be "another
insurer." McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitration between an uninsured victim's father and
another's insurance company. McCaffery v.
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Pleadings.
Summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice was proper,
where the complaint and plaintiff's deposition
tailed to allege any permanent disability or
impairment based on objective findings, and,
further, defendant was not required to support
his motion for summary judgment with affida-
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vits showing there was no permanent disability. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
Reimbursement.
— R e c o v e r y from i n s u r e d and h i s insurer.
Where passenger collected personal injury
protection benefits from driver's insurer and
received an additional settlement in an action
against the driver of the other car, the insurer
had no right of subrogation to the recovery of
the passenger, but could claim reimbursement
from the other driver's insurer in an arbitration
proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d
1197 (Utah 1980).
R e l e a s e given by i n j u r e d p a r t } to tortfeasor.
Injured party who entered into a settlement
agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he
released the tort-feasor from any and all known
and unknown personal injury as well as property damage arising from the auto accident, cut
off his insurance company's subrogation rights,
and by so doing was not entitled to further
benefits from his insurance company under the
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), but see Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
Insurer's obligation to continue to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits was not
extinguished by a settlement and release between its insured and the tortfeasor because
there was no evidence that the parties understood or intended that the settlement include
PIP benefits, and the release did not extinguish
the insurer's right under this section to seek
reimbursement for further PIP payments from
the torfeasor's insurer through binding arbitration. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d
1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
T o r t claims.
—Liability of i n s u r e d .
If a party has the security required under
§ 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immunity and is not personally liable for the benefits
provided under § 31A-22-307, but he remains
liable for customary tort claims of general damages and economic losses not compensated under § 31A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
— P l e a d i n g and i n s t r u c t i o n s .
When injured party is entitled under threshold provisions of this section to maintain claim
for personal injuries not compensated by personal injury protection benefits, the injured
party should plead only for those damages for
which he has not received reparation under his
first party insurance benefits; to present a
completely factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present evidence of all
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his medical bills or other economic losses; in
such a case, the court, by appropriate instruction, could explain to the jury that those economic losses have not been included in the
prayer for damages because the injured party
has previously received reparation under his
own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie,
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).
Workers' compensation.
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection
(3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under
its insurance policy any liability for injuries
that are compensable under the workers' compensation statute or a similar statutory7 plan.
This provision, however, is irrelevant in a proceeding before the Industrial Commission in-

volving only the employee and an employer who
has carried no-fault insurance but not workers'
compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
A state employee who was injured in a car
accident in the course of her employment was
entitled to collect personal injury protection
(PIP) benefits under this section, to the extent
those benefits were not covered by workers'
compensation. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision, § 35-1-60 (now § 34A-2105), does not bar such action; the provision of
the state's self-insurance program excluding
PIP benefits to any person entitled to workers'
compensation benefits is not in harmony with
statutory requirements, and is therefore invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Under Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379.
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev.
553.
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 571.
AX.R. — Validity and construction of "nofault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
229.
Injury or death caused by assault as within
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44
A.L.R.4th 1010.
Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of

liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance
policy, or statute mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.
Right of employer or workers' compensation
carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of,
uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeds
payable to employee injured by third party, 33
A.L.R.5th 587.

31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan.
(1) After consultation with insurers authorized to issue policies containing
the provisions specified under Section 31A-22-302, the insurance commissioner shall approve a reasonable plan for the equitable apportionment among
the insurers of applicants for those policies who are in good faith entitled to,
but are unable to procure, these policies through ordinary methods.
(2) Upon the commissioner's approval of a plan under this section, all
insurers issuing policies described under Section 31A-22-302 shall subscribe to
and participate in the commissioner's approved plan.
(3) Any applicant for a policy under the commissioner's plan, any person
insured under the plan, and any insurer affected by the commissioner's plan
may appeal to the insurance commissioner from any ruling or decision of the
manager or committee designated to operate the plan.
(4) Section 31A-2-306 applies to the commissioner's decision on this appeal.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-310, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 161, § 82.
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' " i ? ^ . j ! .ii, \\\ DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
a division of WINDSOR GROUP.
INC.,

ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

LAURIE BOTT and EVAN B< ) l"i

Civil No. 990903734
Judae Timothv R. Hanson

Defendants.

Tin

" "in Miiiiiii' l'ili<i-il'

,,i' I •• ,-il ,ii"iniuM i ii December 20, 1999 on the

parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and the court having reviewed the memoranda
submitted by the parties, received oral argument !>>, mun-d and ukcu n'u .n.iiiu under
advisement ilii umil miw mles as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds the following facts to be tine:
1.

The defendants Laurie and Evan Bott. are heirs of the decedent. Jesse E. Bott.

2.

The defendants also properly represent the estate of Jesse Bott and the heirs of Jesse

3.

Jesse Bott died instantly as a result of an automobile accident of November 7, 1998.

4.

Plaintiff paid to the heirs under its policy the personal injury protection benefits of

Bott.

$3,000 for the death benefit and $1,500 for the funeral benefits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court further rules:
1.

The named defendants properly represent themselves, the estate of Jesse Bott and

the heirs of Jesse Bott.
2.

The heirs and estate of Jesse Bott are not "persons" under the policy or under the

no-fault provisions of Utah legislation, i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-306, 307 and 308 (1990).
3.

Jesse Bott's "death" is not a "disability" under the policy or the Utah No-Fault

Statutes.
4.

Work loss and household services are payable to insured persons incapacitated by

automobile accidents and are not payable to decedents, their heirs or their estates.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court
orders that the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted, the defendants' motion for
2

summary judgment is denied, the defendants' counter-claim is dismissed and the plaintiffs prayer
for declaratory judgments granted.
DATED this^^dav of -

XU^

. 2000.

/ >

Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ljj_ day o f J / l m ^ - w 2000, I mailed, via First Class Mail,
postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing^ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following:
Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendants
Second Floor
261 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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T.J. Tsakalos (3289)
Of Counsel
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1708
Fax:(801)359-9004
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
a division of WINDSOR GROUP.
INC.,
Plaintiff,

;
)
;
;

vs.

]

LAURIE BOTT and EVAN BOTT

;I
1

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Civil No. 990903734
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

)

The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismisses their counterclaim and grants the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants the plaintiff declarator}'
judgment as follows:
1.

No work-loss benefits are due to the defendants, the estate of Jesse Bott, or to his

heirs under the Regal policy described in the complaint.

2.

No household services benefits are due to the defendants, the estate of Jesse Bott

or his heirs under the Regal policy described in the complaint.
3.

The defendants' counter claim is dismissed with prejudice.

4.

Each party will bear its own costs and fees.

SO ORDERED this ^

'day of

{_\c^^

2000.

^
Honorable
Judge Timothy R Hanson
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the \Q_ day of\J# k^dl^OOO. I mailed, via First Class Mail,
postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following:
Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendants
Second Floor
261 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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16

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of
December, 1999, commencing at the hour of 10:04 a.m.,
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following videotape proceedings were had.
-oOo-
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84111
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SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

The record will show

we're in session in the Regal Insurance versus Laurie
Bott and others, 990903734, on the Court's calendar for
the plaintiff's motion for summary judg—well, actually,
it's cross motions for summary judgment.

Pardon me.

Appearances, please, Counsel?
MR. TSAKALOS:

T.J. Tsakalos for

plaintiff, Regal Insurance, a division of the Windsor (?)
Group, your Honor.
MR. SMITH:

Steven B. Smith for the

defendants and counter-plaintiffs.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

I think the plaintiff's motion was first in
time, was it not?
MR. SMITH:

It was.

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Tsakalos,

would you like to start, please?
MR. TSAKALOS:

Yes, your Honor.

For-

-in order to shorten things down, I think we have filed
cross motions for summary judgment and I'll try to
address as many of the arguments as I can now the first
time around and save very little for rebuttal.
Both parties have submitted pretty extensive
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briefs on the issue.

I think it's relatively clear what

the issues are and where the cases are going on it.
Basically, your Honor, just by background,
Jessie Bott was a single individual that died instantly
in an automobile accident in which he was a passenger.
My company paid the funeral benefits, the burial benefits
and then we reached a settlement with his parents.
I want to get directly to the claims of—that
they are entitled to additional no-fault benefits,
specifically lost income and the household services.

I

think we have to take a look at the act and note that the
purpose of the no-fault act was to provide a no-fault
mechanism for compensation for individuals while they're
recuperating.
And in this particular case—and—and the
purpose of that no-fault act, I should say, is to try to
get these people on their feet, kind of keep them whole
while they're recuperating and hopefully, the objective
is to avoid bringing a tort claim into the system.
Now, in this particular case, I think it's
important to note that we're dealing with a specific kind
of policy that seems to have some sort of hybrid
characteristics, but I want to make clear the
distinctions that I think the plaintiffs—or the
claimants are focusing on and I want up front that the
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act is not a life insurance policy that gives a benefit
to the estate or heirs.
It—and that appears to be the approach here,
that it is both a disability policy and a life policy
that automatically provides benefits and I don't think
that was the intent of the legislature from the statutes,
and it's certainly not the intent of the policy which
follows the statute.
Jessie Bott's parents and—and after I have
reviewed the statutes, are not even persons entitled to
benefits.

They don't fall within the omnibus clause,

that says—the statute that says, here's who gets
benefits.

They are not injured persons under the policy.

The only time that they are compensated under the nofault act is when there is a direct—when there is a
death and they are the heirs.
And in this particular case, under both the
statute and under the policy, they got that death benefit
and they also got the funeral benefit.
There seems to be a big approach by the
claimants in this particular case that somehow death and
disability are the same, and they are not, and our Utah
Court has so recognized.
It—it—just to take it in a—in a simple view,
I may have life insurance and I may have a disability
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policy.

Upon my death, my family collects under the life

insurance, but they don't get disability payments until
my natural life or under the life tables I would have
died in the normal course of events.
other.

They get one or the

If I'm disabled, I get disability benefits.

I

don't get life insurance.
In this particular case, the claimants want
both.

They're claiming they get disability benefits,

which is for lost household services and the—and the
lost income, plus they get the—the death benefits that
were provided under the statute and under the policy.
Additionally, I think it's important for the
Court to note that household services are provided under
our no-fault statute to the injured person to help them
keep their home and their estate so—not the estate in
terms of the wron—of the death, but in terms of their
household, in terms of getting lawns mowed or getting
dishes taken care of or cooking, while they're
recuperating.
In this particular case, Jessie lived at home
with his parents.

It—it is not Jessie's house—it is

Jessie's household, if any, that could have made the
claim, not Jessie's parents that could have made the
claim.

And more importantly, we need to keep in mind

that Jessie was a passenger in a vehicle in which he died
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from the accident that is not even under his own policy
that they are attempting to make this double collection,
as I view it.
Finally, as I've stated in my briefs,
particularly the Kentucky case, the parents and the
estate, Jessie's estate, are not persons within the
statute.

That's already been decided by the Kentucky

court and household services and lost wages are, like I
said, are to provide to recuperating persons to try to
make—keep them whole, until they're back, functioning in
a normal sort of way and avoid the tort system.
Finally, in the rebuttal that I was putting
together, your Honor, I did stumble across Marriott vs.
Pacific Life Insurance, the Utah case from 1970,
involving an employee where they were trying to claim
disability benefits and death benefits at the same time.
And our court was very clear in saying, you cannot equate
death with disability and even though tha.t definition is
included within the policy, as I've pointed out, in both
the Oregon court cases that I cited to the Court, it
simply does not get you from—it helps define bodily
injury for when personal injury benefits kick in, but it
doesn't say you get household services, lost income,
death benefits, all at the same time for one event which
resulted in an instantaneous death.
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And that's basically our approach and I tried
to take for the Court and for the claimants, your Honor,
just go to the definitions from the dictionary and I
think there's a hang-up in their behalf that life span
and lifetime are the same thing and they're not
Life span, as I've pointed out in my briefs are
the time that you exist—that is the language the policy
uses.

When your life ends, those benefits end, other

than you may get—your estate may get the death benefits
or the funeral benefits.
And I think it's an unfortunate accident, but
he died instantly and he's not entitled—they are not
entitled, under either definition or by statute or by the
policy to receive household services and lost income on
an instantaneous death and that's basically our approach.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Smith?
MR. SMITH:

To begin with, your

Honor, I think it's important to—to look at, in the
beginning, the purpose of the insurance code set out in
31-A-1-102, that is t o — I have copies for the Court.
Under 102(2), it's to insure the policy holders,
claimants and insurers are treated fairly and equitably.
And then under 201, that the Code should be
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liberally construed to achieve the purposes stated in
that section.
Under Utah law, anyone that issues an
automobile insurance policy in this State is obligated to
provide certain coverages.

Part of those coverages

required by law include the personal injury pirotection
benefits set forth in 31-A-22-307.
To begin with, we would dispute that t h e — t h e —
on the immediacy of death question.

I don't know that

that's been conclusively established insofar as it may
make a difference and we'd reserve the right to contest
that, if it does—if it is an issue.
Nevertheless, the argument that—
THE COURT:

I don't know.

Is it an

MR. SMITH:

I don't believe that it's

issue or isn't it?

an issue.

I think that we're beyond that.
THE COURT:

Do you believe that he

went on for days or weeks or months?
MR. SMITH:

No.

He didn't, he died

at the scene and there were no medical expenses other
than ambulance.
THE COURT:

Well, I think for the

purposes of these motions, he died immediately.
MR. SMITH:
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Okay.

But the—the

argument that the Botts are not entitled to PIT benefits,
at no time have the Botts personally made any claim for
PIT benefits.

The Botts7 claim has always been on behalf

of Jessie Bott, on behalf of their son, they're his only
heirs and they made the claim on behalf of the estate.
And—
THE COURT:

But the estate isn't

suing here, nor has the estate asserted a counterclaim,
huh?
MR. SMITH:

They—they—I'm going to

say that there was a misnomer of the parties, if that's
the case.

Regal is the one that brought the—
THE COURT:

Well, you—I don't know,

you guys form the pleadings, not me.
MR. SMITH:

Regal's the one that

filed the—filed it, and if you'll look at Regal's
memorandum even, I'm trying to find it, but they
recognized the fact that—it may be in a motion—that the
Botts pursued claims on behalf of the estate of—of
Jessie Bott.

And if that is an issue, we'd make a motion

to amend the pleadings, amend the counterclaim to be a
counterclaim by the Estate of Jessie Bott or as a thirdparty plaintiff, as an intervenor.

That's the way that

the parties would approach this entire thing and T.J.,
isn't the question whether or not wages and household
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services are due to somebody who dies in an automobile
accident, not necessarily who these folks are?
MR. TSAKAL0S:

Well, those are the

issues, your Honor, and I don't have a problem
determining today, is it the estate and/or the Botts
individually.

I think the arguments apply, I've

addressed both in the briefs. We've got cases on
estates—
THE COURT:

Well, the only thing I

know is that I don't have any estate in the pleadings in
this case.
MR. SMITH:

Well, I'm willing to

clean that up right now, however you want to do it.
THE COURT:

I don't.

I'm just here

MR. SMITH:

Okay.

THE COURT:

It's what the two of you

to hear it<

want to do.
MR. TSAKALOS:

Do you want to

proceed?
MR. SMITH:

I—I do want to proceed

and I want to proceed on behalf of—you know, with the
Botts pursuing this claim as representatives of the State
of Jessie Bott.
THE COURT:
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Does Jessie Bott have any

other heirs?
MR. SMITH:

He does not.

THE COURT:

No siblings?

MR. SMITH:

He has siblings.

However, the parents, I think are the sole heirs.
THE COURT:

Did he have a will?

MR. SMITH:

He did not.

THE COURT:

Did he have any children?

MR. SMITH:

No.

I think one of the

stipulated facts was that—that Jessie—or excuse me,
that Laurie and Evan Bott are Jessie Bott's only heirs as
far as the facts that have been stipulated for this
motion.
THE COURT:

I guess my only concern

is, is that if there's no estate established through the
courts and notice given to other persons, how do we ever-how do we not know there's somebody out there who may
claim an interest in the estate here?
MR. SMITH:

Well, I think the

parents, as representatives of the estate would have an
obligation to safeguard and protect anyone else—any of
the other interested parties' rights under the probate
code.
And the stipulated fact, the stip—Paragraph
No. 6 in the Botts' motion states that Laurie and Evan
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Bott are the natural parents and only heirs of Jessie
Bott and the personal representatives of the Estate of
Jessie Bott, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
75-2-103.

I believe that was part of the stipulated

facts that the parties agreed to when these motions were
filed.
THE COURT:

Well, I understand that,

but unless some probate court has made the a first
representative of the estate, then it appears that there-there is no estate, unless these monies come into it.
MR. SMITH:

Well, the money that

THE COURT:

This seems to me you've

they—well—

got a procedural problem and a party problem that needs
to be agreed to.

I have no problem if you want to call

this Laurie and Bott—and Laurie Bott and Evan Bott a s —
on—for and on behalf of the State of Jessie Bott.
That's fine with me, but—
MR. SMITH:

Is that all right with

you?
MR. TSAKALOS:
MR. SMITH:

Works for me.

Individually and on the

estate?
MR. TSAKALOS:
done.
12

Sure.

Let's get.it

THE COURT:

All right.

You can amend

the pleadings, submit an order so indicating based on
stipulation of the parties.
MR. SMITH:

Okay.

The argue—the

argument that we make is that the Estate of Jessie Bott
is entitled to PIT benefits.

31-A-22-308 discusses the

categories of individuals who are entitled to the
protections required by statute and that's where it talks
about any other natural persons who injuries arise out of
an automobile accident occurring while the person
occupies the insured motor vehicle.
The arguments of Regal would permit them to
escape any responsibility for the PIT benefits of someone
dies, under their argument that the estate doesn't
constitute a person, which we would entirely disagree
with.
The Court—it's fairly simple—or it's fairly—
I mean, it's a fairly straightforward interpretation of
the statute, the legislative intent needs to be defined
by the language that is used and the language that is not
used.
The PIT benefits that are required by law are
set forth in Section 307. There are basically four
categor—or four categories of PIT benefits.

Under

307(1)(a), it's the medical expenses; under 307(b), it's
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the lost wages and the household services; under 307(c)
funeral expenses and under 307(1)—or 307(1)(d), it's the
death compensation.
The—if the death compensation, funeral
expenses were not—were supposed to be only paid when
there was a surviving individual, the legislature easily
could have put "or" after Subsection (b). They did not.
Their failure to put "or" was four separate and distinct
categories and those—that needs to be applied to the
facts of the accident.
Under the lost wages, it reads simply that it
should be paid, the lesser of

$250 per week or 85

percent of any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from inability to work.

And then it

puts a maximum number of days, after—52 consecutive
weeks after the loss.
And we—Jessie Bott, I think it is undisputed
is unable to work, he has an inability to work, he's had
a loss of gross earning capacity, he was working at the
time of this accident, he was bringing income in, he was
helping contribute to the household finances of the
family.
Under the next section of (b) is the household
services and under the statu—the—the benefits have to
be provided for services actually rendered or expenses
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reasonably incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have performed for his
household.
And in this case, Jessie Bott sustained an
injury, a life-ending injury which prevented him from
doing numerous tasks at home.
THE COURT:

Well, do you think

there's a difference between being injured and being
killed?
MR. SMITH:

I think someone can die

without an injury; but I think in this particular case,
that the death resulted from an injury in the—
THE COURT:
my question.

Well, that didn't answer

The legislature uses:

if a person is

injured, they're entitled to certain benefits.

Does the

legislature have in mind that when they use the word
"injury", they also meant to say that as a result of a
person's death, they're entitled to certain benefits?
MR. SMITH:

I think the legislature

could have done that, but I don't think that—I think
that in this case, the vast majority of people in—that
are involved in an automobile accident are going to be
injured and that's what they're looking at in this case.
I don't think that excludes someone who's been killed
from making a recovery—recovery for these same items of-
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-of benefits.
THE COURT:

I know you're saying

that, but what I—but what I asked is whether or not you
see a difference between the legislature using the word
"injury" and not using the word "death".

It says a

person who is injured is entitled to loss of household
services and loss of income.

It doesn't say a person who

is injured or killed.
MR. SMITH:

And that may b e —

THE COURT:

Does that make a

MR. SMITH:

I don't think that it

difference?

makes a difference in this case.

Not—I think that if

the death results from an injury, that he falls within
this category and is entitled to that measure of
benefits.
But there's no statutory language cited in
Kentucky, no definition of disability and the analogy to
a disability insurance policy is rather misleading as
well.

In every disability insurance policy, there is a

specific definition of disability that doesn't exist in
this case and again, I think that when you read the
entire Section 307 that discusses what types of PIT
benefits must be provided—and admittedly, the statutory-or excuse me, the policy language would not provide
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benefits if the policy language was not violative of the
statute, but they cannot limit their coverage any more
than what's required by the statute.

No matter what they

say in the policy, if it limits it less than what's
required, that—those policy provisions are stricken.
THE COURT:

Has the—was the policy

submitted for approval by the insurance commissioner?
MR. SMITH:

I believe it was. I

don't—I don't know—
THE COURT:

I guess that the

insurance commissioner at least thought—whatever that's
worth—that it complied with the statute.
MR. SMITH:

Well, there have been

other cases in the past where that hasn't been the case.
THE COURT:

Well, I understand that;

I'm just saying that it has been submitted and apparently
the insurance commissioner, who is charged with the
responsibility of seeing that the policies comply with
state law thought that the policy complied with state
law.
MR. SMITH:

We—we checked with the

insurance commissioner's office and they have never
rendered an opinion or bulletin on this issue.
THE COURT:

But they didn't refuse to

accept the policy for writing in Utah, did they?
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MR. SMITH:

No, They did not.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SMITH:

And we think this is a

straightforward poli—or statutory—statutory
interpretation that the separate and distinct categories
indicated by Sub-parts (a), (b), (c) and (d) are four
types of PIT benefits that are required to be paid when
someone is injured or, in this case, killed in an
automobile accident.

And that the Estate of Jessie Bott

is entitled to those benefits from Regal Insurance.
THE COURT:

Mr. Smith, did you find

any cases outside Utah that seemed to be with the same
issue, that said now the estate of a deceased person is
entitled to these types of no-fault benefits?
MR. SMITH:
there.

I believe they7re out

I—I could probably submit them by the end of the

day, if the Court would like.
THE COURT:

But you haven't—

MR. SMITH:

I—

THE COURT:

— a t least not in your

MR. SMITH:

No. No.

THE COURT:

Even though I—I guess

brief?

everybody agrees Utah hasn't spoken on that, b u t —
MR. SMITH:
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It has not and I spoke

with several; adjustors and they came down all over the
board on this.

Some said—
THE COURT: Well, I'm less impressed

by adjustors than I—than you are by the insurance
commissioner.
MR. SMITH:

Whatever that's worth.

THE COURT: Whatever that's worth.

I

don't even know who the insurance commissioner is these
days.
Okay.

Thank you. Appreciate it.

Mr. Tsakalos, anything further?
MR. TSAKALOS:

I'm just going to make

a couple of quick comments, your Honor.

The policy—to

address the question of whether this policy's been
approved.

If you'll note, that was attached to the

complaint, it's Policy No JAR43C.

That's the third

edition that's been submitted to Utah for approval.

It's

been in effect since 3-1995, so this is a policy approved
by the insurance commission, if that's a (sic) issue for
the Court.
I have cited a number of cases to the Court
that is addressed, estates, heirs in terms of claiming
wages and special lost household services. Again, we've
talked about—counsel raised the issue of which
categories the statute allows—mandates PIT benefits for.
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When it talks about wages, it talks about—the
statute talks about the disabled person, during his
disability.

When it talks about the special damage

allowance, it again uses the term "injured person".
Neither of those categories talk about estates, heirs or
decedents or a policy holder or someone entitled to PIT
benefits who has died.
The—the only time you find that term is when
they talk about the death benefit.

The statute refers to

the death benefit payable to his heirs.
And if we take the approach that the claimants
are making today, simply because the statute has set
forth all of these potential benefits that you may be
entitled to under no-fault, I guess we could take the
reverse; had Jessie Bott been injured and goes along for
six months, 52 weeks and says, golly gee, there's a death
benefit and a funeral benefit, so I'm going to collect a
special damage allowance, the lost wages and certainly
the death and the funeral benefit.
So, the statute, even the way the scheme that
the legislature put in the statute, isn't you just
automatically get all those benefits, you must fall in
these categories.
And there appears to be no dispute today that
the policy provides any greater coverage than the statute

20

and I think the Court has enough to rule that they are
not entitled to anything beyond the funeral, the death
benefit and then we've already paid the bodily injury
that's covered the wrongful death claim in this
particular case.
THE COURT:

No, that's under a

separate part of it, nothing to do with this case.
MR. TSAKALOS:
THE COURT:

Right. Right.

That's (inaudible)

provision.
MR. TSAKALOS:

But that's what the

tort system was designed to do and this is not the tort
system, this is the (inaudible) system.
I think we're ready to submit it, your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. TSAKALOS:

Unless you have

questions of me.
THE COURT:

I don't think so.

Do you wish one more comment, you get the last
statement, you've got a motion.
MR. SMITH:

We don't think that it

would be fair or equitable to permit an insurance company
to avoid payment of a wage or a household service benefit
simply because the individual died.

Under that argument,

the insurance companies are made better, have to pay less
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out if their insured happens to kill someone as opposed
to only injure them.
And the purposes of the insurance code require
the interpretation of that code in order to do fairness
in equity to all the parties and it is not unfair to
insurance companies to require them to pay the same kind
of benefits to someone that's been killed plus a funeral
and survivor benefit as it would be if they had only been
injured.
And in the interest of justice, we believe
that—and under the statutory interpretation, we believe
that the Estate of Jessie Bott is entitled to all four
categories of the benefits mandated by the law.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

I haven't read the cases that apparently deal
with, either directly or collaterally, with the issue
outside the—reported outside the State.
the case, itself.

I haven't read

I've read them in your briefs, but I

think I'll take a look at a couple of them, see what they
have to say and see if I think any of them are
interesting enough to consider their inclusion in this.
So, I'll take the matter under advisement.
Gentlemen, I'll probably issue a brief written opinion,
when I've had a chance to look at those cases and I
probably won't get to it until next week some time, so
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1

it'll b e —

2

MR. SMITH:

3

additional cases to the Court?

4

THE COURT:

5

Can—can we submit

No,

Today's t h e —

briefings over with, gentlemen.

6

MR. SMITH:

You do need an order

7

saying that this is the estate and the heirs, that's what

8

we need to clean up between now and your ruling; is that

9

the only—

10

THE COURT:

Well, I don't care how

11

soon you do it, but I do need something to say—I need an
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order in the file that says based on the stipulation of
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the parties, the defendants in this case are here as
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representatives of the estate of the deceased, Jason

15

Bott; right?

16

MR. SMITH:

Jessie.

17

THE COURT:

So that—so that I have

18

Okay.

an estate here that I can deal with.
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MR. SMITH:

We'll get that done.

20

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

21

MR. SMITH:

Thank you, your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

We'll be in recess.
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(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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Life. That state of animals, humans, and plants or of an
organized being, in which its natural functions and
motions are performed, or in which its organs are capable of performing their functions. The interval between
birth and death. The sum of the forces by which death
is resisted.

"Life" protected by the Federal Constitution includes
all personal rights and their enjoyment of the faculties,
acquiring useful knowledge, the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children, freedom of worship,
conscience, contract, occupation, speech, assembly and
press.
See also Natural life; Useful life; Viability; Viable child;
Wrongful life.

